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Since the 2004 EU enlargement established one European common labour market, a large number of
Eastern Europeans have taken up seasonal employment as hired farm workers in Norwegian agriculture.
Much attention in the public has been given to the potential for ‘social dumping’ of these migrating
workers, as they are considered prone to exploitation by farmers looking for cheap and docile labour, and
subject to low-wages and poor labour conditions. In response to these threats, Norway implemented
labour regulations (‘transitional rules’) that established minimum standards for wage levels and labour
conditions, combined with registration and supervision of the incoming labour force. Nevertheless,
reports from the ﬁeld indicate that many of the westward migrating labour force experience work
conditions that are far poorer than prescribed by the labour regulations, as these are not implemented at
the farm level. In this paper, we discuss the social processes that result in this mismatch between state
regulations (e.g. transition rules) and the actual experiences of migrant workers building on dual labour
market theory. Analysing qualitative in-depth interviews with 54 farm migrants, we argue that there are
two sets of factors underlying the poorer working conditions observed on the farms: Firstly, the struc-
tural disempowerment of migrant workers, which gives them weak negotiating positions vis-a`-vis their
employers (farmers); and secondly, the migrant workers’ frame of reference for wage levels, in which
poor payment levels by Norwegian standards are found acceptable or even good when judged by Eastern
European wage levels. While a number of works have described the exploitation of farm migrant labour,
we demonstrate in this paper how national immigration and agricultural histories, structures and
present policies conﬁgure the labour–capital relations at farm level in the Norwegian case.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. The new farm labour force Norway’s 50,000 farms, primarily as short-term/seasonal workers,The 2004 EU enlargement accelerated economic, political and
institutional integration between Western and Eastern European
states. Among the most important changes was the opening up of
Western European labour markets for citizens from the new
member states, resulting in increased streams of migrant workers
from Eastern to Western Europe (CEC, 2006). Norwegian farmers1
have been among thosemost eagerlymaking use of this new supply
of cheap labour. In 2007, some 27,000 migrants worked onnd Political Science, Norwe-
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All rights reserved.and their work constituted about 10% of the sector’s total work
input that year (Vik, 2008).
Norwegian farmers employing Eastern Europeans have
welcomed the deregulation of labour markets, as migrants provide
inexpensive and good labour. However, extensive recruitment of
low-paid foreigners also generates series of challenges for the
Norwegian agricultural sector. Particularly, it has been accused by
trade union representatives and the media of exploiting the
migrating farm workers who are one of the most vulnerable
groups on the labour market (so-called ‘social dumping’). This may
challenge the popular image of farmers in the Norwegian public as
being hard-working but poorly paid self-employed men and
women, who are exploited rather than exploit others. Such
a change in the public image of farming may in effect have
profound implications for the trade, as a large part of its income
comprises of direct state transfers. In 2007, the country’s 50,000
farms received about 1.4 billion Euros in subsidies, an average of
27,500 Euros per farm. Public perception of farmers spending
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present-day widespread public support for up-keeping of an
extensive national agricultural production (Dalen and Lillebø,
2007; Rye, 2008).
Mindful of concerns about farm-based labour relations, farmers’
organisations in Norway were generally positive towards the
transitional rules implemented by Norwegian authorities in 20042
(Rye and Frisvoll, 2007). These rules established minimum stan-
dards for wage levels (deﬁned by minimum rates in tariff agree-
ments) and labour conditions, combined with registration and
supervision of the incoming labour force (Dølvik and Eldring,
2006), and were seen as an important tool to prevent ‘social
dumping’ by Norwegian authorities. Ofﬁcial spokespeople for
farmers have at the same time campaigned to enhance farmers’
compliance with the transitional rules, for example through media
statements emphasising that good treatment of the migrant labour
force is pivotal for continued political support for the agricultural
business, and thus, for the survival of the farming sector as a whole
(Rye and Frisvoll, 2007). Interestingly, when the Norwegian
authorities decided to end transitional arrangements by May 2009,
farmers’ spokespersons agreed with the trade unions on the need
for alternative measures to secure minimum levels of work
conditions. A national regulation of general application of wage
agreements was proposed by trade unions, which, in effect, implies
that farmers’ still are required to pay migrant workers according to
tariff agreements regardless of their union membership.
Nevertheless, reports from the ﬁeld indicate that certain sectors
of the in-migrating labour force experience work conditions that
are far worse than prescribed by labour laws, as regulations are not
implemented at many Norwegian small-scale family farms.
Underpayment is reported to be common, many workers receive
less per hour than stipulated, and they rarely receive overtime pay
or other beneﬁts granted by Norwegian labour laws, e.g. sick pay
and vacation pay. Work conditions are often poor, as are the living
arrangements offered. In general, the situation of the migrant farm
labour force resembles what in the literature has been labelled the
second tier in dual labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971;
Piore, 1970, 1975, 1979; see Rye, 2007a for an overview).
In this paper, we discuss the social processes that may produce
this mismatch between state regulations (e.g. the transition rules)
and the actual experiences of Eastern European migrant workers in
Norwegian agriculture. Thus, at the theoretical level, the key
research question of the paper is why EU and nationally-sanctioned
labour regulations aimed at guaranteeing migrant labour’s rights
do not translate into actual practices at farm level. Employing the
dual labour market theory as a theoretical backdrop, we address
this question by providing an in-depth analysis of the situation of
farm migrant labour in Norway. Integral to this analysis is an
emphasis on how the particularities of the national (Norwegian)
agricultural context inﬂuence the implementation of labour–
capital relation at farm level.
Empirically, we address the research question through a corpus
of 54 qualitative, in-depth interviews with migrant farmworkers in2 Transitional regulations varied among the ‘old’ EU member states. The
governments of England, Sweden and Ireland liberalised access to their labour
markets for the citizens of EU8 group (i.e. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia); other countries maintained
their work permit systems, although with some modiﬁcations. For instance, Italy
and Portugal combined a work permit system with a special entry quota; France
maintained its work permit system with some exceptions (i.e. in the research
sector), and Germany and Austria additionally applied restrictions also on the
posting of workers in certain sensitive sectors. Although Norway was one of the
countries which maintained work permit schemes, obtainment of such a permit is
almost automatic, provided there is a full-time employment offer from a Norwegian
employer, guaranteeing equal work and payment conditions to domestic workers.Norway. We analyse the relationships between employers and
employees at farm level in order to identify the micro-level social
mechanisms that may generate low-wages and poor labour
conditions for the migrants. We argue that there are two sets of
factors underlying this phenomenon: ﬁrstly, the structural dis-
empowerment of migrant workers gives them weak negotiating
positions vis-a`-vis their employers. Secondly, the migrant workers’
frame of reference for wage levels is usually their homeland stan-
dard, which makes their wages in Norway appear not only
acceptable but relatively high, and thus lowers the incentive to
bargain for higher wages.
The paper consequently argues that informal institutions
established at the farm level, which favour the farmers as the
stronger party in the employer–employee relationship, in practice
often override the state-sanctioned formal institutions created by
the transition rules and other labour regulations. State regulations
have nonetheless had an impact on migrants’ wages and work
conditions, however not primarily as an empowering factor for
migrant workers. Rather, these regulations work as a frame of
reference for farmers needing to avoid formal and informal sanc-
tions from third party domestic actors, for example, by fear of
gaining a reputation in public and political debates for the exploi-
tation of migrant employees.
Furthermore, we show how this situation is dependent on
national particularities of the Norwegian case. The described situ-
ation is theorised to be corroborated by the historical farming
structure of farming, e.g. the small-scale family farm character of
Norwegian agriculture and the pre-2004 immigration regulation
regime, as well as the present-day political framework, e.g. state
subsidies and production controls.
2. Norwegian agriculture, Eastern European migrants
The outcomes of the deregulated European labour market seem
particularly clear in Norway, especially in its agricultural sector.
Norway receives large numbers of migrant workers relative to its
population size of 4.6 million, and has been the main destination of
Eastern European migrant workers among the Nordic countries
(Dølvik and Eldring, 2006). In 2008, the Norwegian Directorate of
Immigration issued about 79,000 individual work permits to
Eastern European citizens (Norwegian Directorate of Immigration,
2009). Beyond the ofﬁcial ﬁgures, there is an additional unknown
number of persons working in Norway on other work arrange-
ments, for example, as private suppliers of services, out-stationed
personnel, or undocumented migrants.
The Norwegian agricultural sector is one of the major employers
of this labour force, especially during the summer season. In 2007,
some 27,000 immigrants worked on Norway’s 50,000 farms, most
of them as short-term/seasonal workers (Vik, 2008). This presence
of a largemigrant labour force represents a relatively new feature of
Norwegian agriculture. As late as in 1990, only about 4300 work
permits were given to foreign farm workers under the state
seasonal immigration quota programme which was established
that year. Since then, the use of foreign labour on Norwegian farms
has increased steadily (see Rye and Frisvoll, 2007 for an overview).
This is due to developments both within the wider society and the
agricultural sector over the recent years. Firstly, the traditionally
ﬂexible labour force of housewives, students and other groups who
potentially engage in manual seasonal work has diminished over
the recent decades. Secondly, prior to the present global ﬁnancial
crisis a long-lasting economic boom produced very low levels of
unemployment in Norway and this additionally shrunk the national
labour force reserve available to the agricultural sector. Thirdly,
farmers face increasing competition for the remaining part-time
labour force from other trades, which are usually able to offer
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undergone processes of restructuring and industrialisation,
resulting in an increased demand for hired labour at the cost of
family labour. Fewer farms (and thus, fewer farming families) today
produce the same amount of agricultural goods. For example, the
number of farms growing strawberries, one of the sectors which
relies most heavily on foreign labour from Eastern Europe,
decreased by 55% between 1999 and 2008. In the same period, the
strawberry production fell by less than 8% as measured in the size
of cultivated land with strawberry plants (Norwegian Agricultural
Authority, 2009). Similar developments are observed in other
agricultural commodities.
The Norwegian farmers’ increased demand for hired labour has
been matched by the abundance of Eastern European citizens
searching for employment in Western Europe in recent years. From
their perspective, the EU enlargement and ‘opening up’ of Western
European labour markets provide new, attractive opportunities.
Despite the great variation of migration patterns across the region,
similar underlying facts seem to drive the out-migration processes.
Themost recent labour ﬂows appear to be a response to the existing
welfare gap, with real, material and measurable differences in the
standard of living, level of social security (including exposure to
social, ethnic and gender conﬂicts) and disparities between Norway
and Eastern European states (Godzimirski, 2005). For example, the
GDP levels in the EU8 are much lower than in the destination
countries: in Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic States, the GDP is about
a half of the EU25 average level (World Bank, 2006). This is
reﬂected in the substantial wage gap between countries inWestern
and Eastern Europe. To give an example, the average gross annual
earnings in industry and services in Poland, which has been the
major supplier of farm labour migrants to Norway, was about 6300
Euros in 2005. This compares to about 45,500 Euros in Norway
(Eurostat, 2007). Serious labour market disequilibria comprise
another push factor from the sending countries. Although the
unemployment rate has fallen substantially in some countries, the
Polish rate equalled 13.8 as late as in December 2006 (Fafo, 2007).
Even though we could observe a steady growth in wages in Poland
over the last 2 years, considerable differences in wage levels still
remain. Furthermore, with the increasing impact of the global
ﬁnancial crisis and its consequences, one can expect growing
migration pressure due to the reduction of employment and wages
by domestic companies.
Differences in the economies in Eastern andWestern Europe are
expected to level out in years to come, nevertheless, the westward
streams of migrant labour are likely to continue and even increase
in the short run. Thus, Norwegian farmers will most likely rely on
labour from low-cost/low-wage countries in order to keep their
costs down as they respond to demands of increased efﬁciency in
their farm operations. However, the attractiveness of hired foreign
labour depends upon the arrangements of labour relations between
farmers and migrants, in particular the wage formation processes.
Similarly, the attractiveness of migrant work in Norwegian agri-
culture for citizens in Eastern Europe depends on the wage and
labour conditions that they will be offered on the farms.
The existing legal framework attempts to establish a balance of
power between labour and capital, protecting migrant workers
from ‘social dumping’, while at the farm level there seems to be an
inherent bias towards the interest of employers. A reasonable
hypothesis would be that such a situation in the long run may
prove counter-productive to the needs of Norwegian agriculture.
Given the situation described above, where farmers become more
dependent on hired labour, while Eastern Europeans ﬁnd steadily
improved conditions in their home countries, future recruitment
will require relatively improved labour conditions. However, it is
questionable how far the very structure of the relationshipsbetween farmers and migrant labour allows for substantial
changes in this regard due to the micro-level barriers towards
implementation of national labour regulations within agriculture
identiﬁed in this paper. This is a claim that at least at a general level
relates to key ﬁndings in the existing research, which often has
emphasised the segmentation of ethnically delineated sectors of
labour markets. As will be shown in next section, migrant workers
often ﬁnd work in secondary labour markets where their very
presence reinforces the segmentation of these labour markets
(Martin, 1993).3. Migrants in agriculture – a review
Research on migration into rural areas and the agricultural
sector has a long tradition in the US. Temporary Mexican migrants
in the United States under the Bracero programme, their living and
working conditions, received considerable attention from
researchers (e.g. Friedland and Nelkin, 1971; Goldfarb, 1981; Mize,
2006). There is also a rich literature on the contemporary large
migrant labour work stock in the US agricultural sector, discussing
their vulnerable position in the labour market and causes and
consequences thereof (e.g. Wells, 1996; see Rogaly, 2006 for an
overview). Given the differences both in agricultural production
and immigration traditions, however, it is difﬁcult to translate US
experiences to the European, not to say the Norwegian, context.
Unfortunately, research on rural and agricultural migrants has
been more limited in Europe. The literature reﬂects previous
domination of migration streams from rural South into Northern
European urban centres and, until recently, less research has
examined the European cross-national rural–rural migration
streams. For example, Journal of Rural Studies, the leading European
academic journal in the ﬁeld, has published only one paper related
to the topic over the last 10 years – Hanson and Bell’s (2007)
analysis of Australian seasonal migration. Except for the fact that
the paper discusses a non-European case, it merely mentions the
immigrant farm workers as a part of the overall seasonal labour
stock, and does not elaborate on their particular experiences.
Similarly, the other key European academic journal covering rural
and agricultural topics, Sociologia Ruralis, has not given much
attention to the issue in the last decade. Two papers published in
the journal (Kasimis et al., 2003; Hoggart and Mendoza, 1999)
discuss the Greek and Spanish cases of migrant farm labour, but
neither of these address wage and labour conditions as their main
point of interest.
Kasimis et al. (2003) examine the underlying factors for labour
immigration into Greek agriculture and the way in which the
immigrant labour force has incorporated itself into local economies
and communities. Their key argument is that farm migrants have
covered the demand for labour in Greek agriculture and helped
reduce the labour costs in the industry. Furthermore, the use of
migrant labour has led to a reallocation of family labour on the
farm, relieving family members of the hard manual tasks. Although
the authors pay little attention to the work and payment conditions
of migrants, they note however that migrants are usually hired to
do the hardest and most unhealthy jobs, while at the same time
receiving poor wages and experiencing long working days. Hoggart
and Mendoza’s (1999) study, which discusses the reasons behind
African immigrant employment in Spanish agriculture and the
employment patterns of these workers at the provincial level
seems to have more relevance to our analysis. The authors
emphasise the uncertainty of farm employment due to the lack of
permanent contracts accompanied by low-wages and poor working
conditions. Thus, as Hoggart and Mendoza argue, the Spanish
agricultural labour market has developed the characteristics of
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(1971) and Piore (1970,1975,1979).
These Mediterranean experiences, stemming from the stable
increase of numbers of immigrants in Southern European econo-
mies over the last 20 years, has led researchers to formulate the
‘Southern European model of migration’ (King, 2000, referred in
Kasimis and Papadopoulos, 2005), which is characterised by ille-
gality related to strict migration controls imposed by EU, hetero-
geneity of immigrants’ nationalities, differentiation of their social
and cultural origins, predominance of male over female migrants,
and coexistence of immigration, unemployment and underem-
ployment in the countries of reception (Kasimis et al., 2003;
Kasimis and Papadopoulos, 2005).
Over the last few years one could also observe growing inﬂux of
immigrants into rural areas of Northern Europe, and their presence
has become particularly vivid after the 2004 EU enlargement. Some
authors argue that most of workers from the new accession coun-
tries found employment in rural areas (Jentsch, 2007), many in
agriculture. Reﬂecting the increasing numbers of immigrants,
a growing body of literature discussing the underlying mechanisms
of this phenomenon and its implications for rural communities and
migrants themselves has surfaced (Jentsch, 2007; Jentsch et al.,
2007;Gowricharn2002; CRC, 2007; Rogaly, 2006). Although studies
often point to migrant workers’ underpayment and bad working
conditions (e.g. Jentsch, 2007; CRC, 2007), they rarely analyse the
underlying mechanisms of these phenomena, e.g. the micro-
processes of wage formation discussed in the present paper.
One noteworthy exception is Rogaly’s (2006) study of the role of
migrant workers in British agriculture and horticulture. Rogaly
argues that international migrants have become the major work-
force in the labour-intensive harvesting and packaging sector of
British agriculture. He relates this phenomenon to a general pattern
of intensiﬁcation in agricultural production connected to the
growing concentration of retailers’ power in food production and
greater availability of migrant workers. To describe migrants’ situ-
ation on the labour market, Rogaly focuses on three aspects of the
changing ‘work-place regimes’, a concept which ‘encompasses the
whole set of labour arrangements made largely by employers, with
varying degrees of negotiation with labour contractors and work-
forces, and in response to wider labour market legal and
commercial conditions’ (Rogaly, 2006: 3). These aspects are as
follows: the employment of international migrant workers, the
return of the ‘gangmaster’, and ﬁnally, the use of piece rates. The
workings of these mechanisms rely on workers’ vulnerability to
ensure their compliance in the labour force. This vulnerability of
migrant workers is related to their immigration status and lack
of information due to the duration of their stay and poor knowledge
of English (Rogaly, 2006). Rogaly sees the causes of poor working
and payment conditions in farmers’ struggle to meet the retailers’
demands for quality and ‘just-in-time’ delivery.
Anderson (2007) also points to migrants’ vulnerability but relates
it to state immigration controls and labour market policies. State
immigration controls, in particular, give employers greater control
over labour mobility by creating various categories of migrant
workers with diversiﬁed levels of legality and labour entitlements.
Using the concept of ‘precarious work’; which refers to a number of
elements such as the degree of certainty of continuous work, the
degree of control over working conditions, wages, pace, the extent of
protection of workers, and ﬁnally, income; she argues that immi-
gration controls on their own can neither hinder low-wage labour
markets from developing, nor migrants from exploitative employ-
ment practices (Anderson, 2007: 4).
Due to the speciﬁcity of the Norwegian national context for
agricultural production, in particular its small-scale and family
farming character, combined with very strong state regulation(Bjørkhaug and Blekesaune, 2008); transference of ﬁndings in the
referred literature to the Norwegian context needs to be done
cautiously. It is interesting, however, that the only detectable
Norwegian work of relevance prior to the EU enlargement in 2004,
Møller and Jensen’s (1999) report which evaluates the Norwegian
state quota programme for agricultural migrant workers in the
1990s, parallels many of the referred ﬁndings. Their study shows
that migrant workers were an important source of labour for some
segments of the Norwegian agricultural sector, particularly berry
harvesting, already prior to the 2004 enlargement. These migrant
workers did not replace Norwegian ones, but made it possible for
farmers to keep up their production despite low proﬁtability. Thus,
most farmers claim in the study that the alternative to the foreign
labour force is not domestic labour but reduced production or even
the closing down of their farm production. This is explained by the
low-wage level (by Norwegian standards) offered to the migrant
workers. Echoing Hoggart and Mendoza’s (1999) reference to dual
labour market theory, Møller and Jensen (1999) argue that the
agricultural migrant labour force constitute a new, secondary
segment on the Norwegian labour market.
Thus, the existing literature on the migrant agricultural labour
markets in Norway and elsewhere in Europe clearly shows that
these labour markets tend to develop key characteristics of
secondary labour markets. This implies low-paid, low-status jobs,
hard-working conditions and high instability of employment, lack
of promotion and training opportunities, and in a considerable
degree, informal and personal relationship between employers and
employees. According to Piore, international migration is
a response to shortages in labour supply, and fulﬁls the demand for
the lowest positions in social hierarchy. The temporariness of
migration streams to industrialised economies equips migrant
workers with particular social roles. Migrants arrive to their
destination countries mostly to accumulate capital they want to
invest in their home countries. Therefore, their attitude towards
work is purely instrumental – directed at the highest income, at the
same time making them insensitive to the social aspects of work
related to the social status and position that every job determines.
Consequently, migrants are ready to take up low-status jobs, with
long, unsocial hours and bad working conditions. According to
Piore, migrants belong to the marginalised groups on the labour
market, together with farmers/rural workers, housewives, and
youth, and the migratory labour markets are characterised by
minimal wages and unlimited supply of labour. The shaping and
level of wages depend mostly on the relative isolation of immi-
grants from the domestic workers, and the temporary character of
migration decreases the will of immigrants to organise and
generates problems of leadership due to high rotation of workers.
4. Interrogating farm labour relations
In this paper we draw on data collected by the Centre for Rural
Research’s 4-year research project ‘Migrant Farm Labour in
Norwegian Agriculture’ (2005–2008) to explore the relationship
between farmers and hired migrant workers. The analysis is based
on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 54 migrant farm
workers in three chosen study areas (municipalities) in Norway.
These were selected due to prior knowledge about the structure of
Norwegian farming, as they each represent a typical agricultural
sub-system in the country’s agricultural sector. The ﬁrst study area
is characterised by extensive production of fruit and berries on
a large number of small farms. At these, one or two migrants
typically work for 3–6 months. There are close interactions
between farmers and workers, e.g. it is common for migrants to live
in farm buildings and share meals with farmers. The second study
area has a far more intensive, and by Norwegian standards:
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Some of the farms employ relatively large workforces, up to 200,
during harvest season. Thus, social ties between farmers and
workers are looser. The last study area has more traditional farm
structure, very much based on family farming. Dairy farmers are
the main users of foreign labour. However, few farmers need full-
time help and they often ‘share’ one migrant worker in the summer
and during harvesting. These study areas were chosen in order to
cover asmuch as possible of thewide spectrum of farming practices
in Norway. However, as elaborated upon in what follows, we were
surprised by the strong commonalities between the study areas
with regard to the issues addressed in this paper. There were rather
differences of degree and not of kind between migrants in the
respective areas.
Data collection took place in the summer and autumn of 2006. As
result of a prior mapping of all farms’ use of migrant labour in the
study areas, including a questionnaire returned by 80% of the farmers
(N¼ 174), we had a reasonable good overview of the farm migrant
populations in the locations. From this pool a sample ofmigrantswas
strategically selected (Thagaard, 1998) with the objective to cover
workers with different backgrounds and with different work
contexts. The workers were then called on at the work-place and
asked totakepart in theproject. Therewere somerefusals,however in
most cases seemingly not due to fear of sanctions from their
employers. More often time was the problem, as some worked very
long hours and needed their spare time for rest and sleep. Never-
theless, most of the workers agreed to be interviewed.
The age of the sample’s informants spanned from 18 to 54 years,
with an average of 33 years. Three quarters of the interviewees
weremale. Half of the workers had employment in their homeland,
with occupations ranging from craftsmen to teachers. One ﬁfth
were students, and another ﬁfth were unemployed persons stating
that they were not presently looking for work in their homeland.
Only ﬁve workers stated that they were unemployed and actively
searching for work in their country of residence. The average
educational level was also relatively high: 24 of the interviewees
had tertiary education, another 26 were educated to the secondary
level, and four had primary schooling only. Two thirds of the
sample were living with a partner (married or cohabitating) in the
home country, and about half had children. None was bringing
family members to Norway during the work stay.
In order to better contextualise the experiences reported by the
migrant workers, we interviewed (survey and in-depth interviews)
farmers in the study areas, as well as other key informants such as
agricultural bureaucrats in the municipal administration and
leaders of local agricultural organisations. One member of the
research team also spent three weeks on a strawberry farm
engaged in participant observation work prior to the commence-
ment of the interviews.
We registered key information about the workers and their
responses to a pre-deﬁned set of questions in a standardised
questionnaire. However, the main part of the interview was
organised as an informal dialogue structured according to a list of
topics we wanted to raise with the informants. These covered the
past (personal background and motivation for migration), the
present (work and social life at the farm including wage and labour
conditions) and the future (plans, ambitions). Interviews were
conducted in Norwegian, English or Polish, depending on the
informants’ language skills. The majority (42 out of 54) of the
informants were Polish. This was partly due to the fact that Poles
constitute the dominant national group working on farms in the
study areas – they were present on more than three quarters of the
farms, but also reﬂects that the research team included one Pole. No
members of the research team had skills in other Eastern European
languages.As the interview guide included potentially sensitive topics, for
example, possible breaches of labour regulations (wages, working
hours, etc.), we took care to create an atmosphere of trust, ensuring
the informants that no information would be disclosed to their
employers or state authorities. This was particularly important as
the recruitment of informants and subsequent interviews, for
practical reasons, took place on the farm and thus with the
knowledge of the farmers. Despite these limitations, we were
surprised by the degree of openness shown by the informants.
As a qualitative study, this material does not intend to constitute
a statistically representative sample of Norwegian migrant
workers. Results cannot be automatically generalised to this pop-
ulation. However, the material does give corroborated insights into
the logic of the studied phenomenon in the three study areas, and,
as will be elaborated upon later, some of these have a structural
quality that makes it reasonable to transfer (Lincoln and Guba,
1985) results to other agricultural contexts that share the charac-
teristics of the chosen study areas.
5. The marginalisation of farm workers
The empirical backdrop of the present study is the introduction
of the ‘transitional rules’ following the 2004 EU enlargement, and
we will brieﬂy present these and some other key information on
wage regulations and practices in Norwegian labour markets.
Norwegian authorities opted for relatively liberal transitional
rules in 2004 compared to the other Western EU member states
(Dølvik and Eldring, 2006). These included measures to prevent
‘social dumping’ through a regulatory framework governing wage
and labour conditions. The arrangements were to ensure that
workers were offered labour terms at least equal to the national
standard for the given trade and location, as expressed in agree-
ments between employers’ association and trade unions. For the
agricultural sector, this implies in effect a national minimum wage
of 11.00 Euros per hour, which is relatively low compared to other
trades in Norway. For example, the minimum tariff for unskilled
work in construction is 15.10 Euros per hour, and the pay rate per
hour for industrial work in Norway is 19.50 Euros.
Migrant workers’ wage is also lower than the actual wage for
most Norwegian hired farm workers. These are most often
employed on longer term contracts, and thus beneﬁt from higher
pay rates for non-seasonal work, for example, employment lasting
more than 3 months attracts a pay rate of 13.00 EUR per hour.
Moreover, Norwegian farm workers are often able to negotiate far
higher wages than the pay award’s minimum rate, due to the high
demand for labour in the Norwegian economy. Thus, the formal
wage level of migrant farm workers in Norway is relatively low
compared to other employees in the Norwegian labour market,
domestic as well as migrant ones, both within and outside
agriculture.
Moreover, in practice migrant farm workers’ wages are often
even lower than assumed by state regulation. Farmers do not
uniformly conform to the legal wage requirements, and during our
ﬁeldwork we were regularly presented with informal wage
agreements between the parties where wages were substantially
lower than required by law. Such breaches of regulations were
even openly acknowledged among farmers (Rye and Frisvoll,
2007). This impression is supported by other sources, e.g. media
coverage (see Rye, 2008) and reports by the Norwegian Labour
Inspection Authority. For example, their investigation into wage
practices within the strawberry production in the Trøndelag
region concluded that the migrant work stock on average earned
only 5.5 Euros per hour, half the tariff rate (see Roel, 2007). It is
difﬁcult to estimate more exactly how widespread such under-
payment is, as there are no nationwide wage statistics for migrant
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pay scales would be accurately captured in such ofﬁcial data.
The qualitative logic of inquiry in the present study, however,
does allow for an in-depth analysis of the underlying social
mechanisms that may produce such sub-standard wage agree-
ments between farmers and migrant farm workers. Of particular
interest, is that, even though actual wage levels on the farms in the
study areas were lower than assumed by the transitional rules,
migrant workers rarely attempted to negotiate better payment
conditions with their employers. They did not invoke the transi-
tional regulations to execute their rights or use the legal system to
obtain better payment or working conditions. No instances of
industrial action or other collective measures to better work
conditions were registered, not even conceived of by the infor-
mants. Moreover, even when they were aware of the discrepancies
between assumed and actual wages, they still expressed satisfac-
tion with their payment.
In the following, we will analyse this empirical paradox by
focusing on two factors: ﬁrstly, the migrant farmworkers have very
few resources to draw upon in order to negotiate better wages,
even though such claims would be backed by the state authority
(transitional rules and other labour regulations). Secondly, migrant
workers seemingly do not problematise their underpayment, as
they do not relate their earnings to Norwegian standards but rather
compare their payment to the standards of their home countries. In
short: they are in a weak position to bargain for higher wages, and
they do not care much to do so anyway.
5.1. Weak bargaining position
There are several factors responsible for migrant farm workers’
weak negotiating position vis-a`-vis their employers, as there are
various processes leading to disempowerment of workers in the
labour relation. Particularly, we will draw attention to (1) their lack
of knowledge and poor cultural competence, (2) the processes of
informalisation of employment arrangements, (3) the margin-
alisation of migrants, both in the labour market and in the local
community, and (4) the very dynamics of the labour migration
process.
5.1.1. Lack of knowledge/poor cultural competence
The actors’ access to information is important in the formation of
well-functioning institutions of wage negotiations in any labour
market. Neither employers nor employees are able tomake rational
decisions with regard to payment arrangements without proper
knowledge of the wage level of other actors in the particular labour
market and the factors shaping labour relations. Therefore, in order
to understand the dynamics of labour relations between farmers
and migrant workers, we interviewed the latter about their
knowledge of their rights and entitlements, for example, the
implications of the transitional rules, and their actual wage agree-
ments with the farmers. Our respondents, echoing ﬁndings in
studies from other countries (e.g. Bauder, 2006; Rogaly, 2006),
admitted that they often lack information about their entitlements
as employees in Norway. The picture becomes evenmore confusing
when they were asked about their actual wage practices. Some
migrants do not know their actual earnings but only have some
overall idea about their payment. As one of theworkers, ‘Jarek’, said:
I can only guess that this year it’s 55 NOK [6.77 EUR], although last
year it was 45 NOK [5.54 EUR] per hour, tax included. But I made
a deal with the farmer that he pays half of the tax and I pay the
other half, so I had like 50 NOK [6.16 EUR] per hour. (‘Jarek’)
The practice of per-piece payment, particularly widespread in
vegetable production, opens further space for uncertainty andrelativity resulting in a situation where the actual hourly wage is
difﬁcult to estimate. A quote from ‘Karol’, a young doctor from
Poland, illustrates this phenomenon:
.this year is the ﬁrst year when we work per-piece [.] and it’s
some struggle here in the beginning of this piece work, in my
opinion it is [the salary] too small [.] when you ﬁnish work, after
two months in this farm [.] he [the boss] say: ‘I will pay you 81
[9.97 EUR] per hour’. But the job has been done, yea, and you said:
‘mmmm, I’m not satisﬁed, let’s say 85 [10.47 EUR]’, and he says: ‘no,
79 [9.73 EUR]’, yea? ‘No, let’s back to the 81, it’s 81’! (‘Karol’)
The use of piece rates is a widespread practice in agriculture
worldwide. As Ben Rogaly (2006) argues, piece rates have played
important role in the intensiﬁcation of work-place regimes in Great
Britain. They have been used on the one hand to speed up work and
increase labour control, and on the other, they are related to the
reduced prices growers have been obtaining from retailers for their
products (Rogaly, 2006). The confusing feature of piece rates has
also been recognised in a study of employment practices in British
agriculture and horticulture (Precision Prospecting, 2005).
It is important to note that, even when the workers have some
information and do try to negotiate their wages with the employer,
their negotiating position is still weak. This is due to the language
barrier and the lack of social and, in the concepts’ wider sense,
cultural capital. They rarely knowwhat to inquire about or whom to
address, and have few contacts to ask for guidance, in terms of
labour entitlements. In most cases, migrants stated that they leave
all formal arrangements and paperwork related to their stay to the
farmers, i.e. their employer. Somemigrants even admitted that they
signed several documents but did not know what they were about
or did not understand their content. ‘Alina’ reﬂects on that:
I have a contract [.] in Norwegian I guess, or English, I don’t know.
I don’t understand it. It would be much easier if it was in Polish
because there are many people who don’t speak English or they do
but very badly. (‘Alina’)
In other words the migrant workers lack the basic condition for
improving their wage, namely, knowledge of existing terms.
However, this is not only due to farmers withholding information
out of ill will but as much a result of migrants’ more or less insur-
mountable challenges in understanding the Norwegian system of
wages, taxation and other rules. In particular, the complicated and
unclear regulations of the Norwegian tax system lead to uncer-
tainty and confusion amongmigrants, and they often pointed to the
vagueness of the tax regulations as one of the main problems
concerning wage estimations. ‘Lech’, a migrant from Poland
emphasises the importance of information about the tax system:
The tax is about 22–24%, sometimes it’s even about 30% tax. It
depends, we don’t know. It depends on what we are trying to get to
know about it [the tax system]. But it’s not so easy to get infor-
mation about it. We don’t want to make a bad contact with our
boss or to make a problem for him. [.] It is difﬁcult to say how
much we’ll get excluded tax, because we don’t know howmuch tax
we’ll pay. This we get to know when we receive our payment at the
end of the stay. (‘Lech’)
Once more the migrants’ lack of social and cultural capital is
both the cause of the problem as well as the barrier to overcoming
it. They are lost in the details of Norwegian bureaucracy due to their
poor language skills but also due to an apparent lack of informal
contacts with Norwegian nationals whomay be able to offer advice.
This situation resembles ﬁndings in other national contexts (see:
CRC, 2007; Jentsch et al., 2007). For example, the British Commis-
sion for Rural Communities, in its report considering A8 migrant
workers, similarly points to the problems migrants face in and
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lack of information about their rights, entitlements and obligations,
unfair dismissal, poor working conditions, difﬁculties in accessing
mainstream ﬁnancial services, including setting up a bank account,
and accessing basic healthcare (CRC, 2007).
The migrants’ poor knowledge also applies to issues outside the
employer–employee relationship. As EU citizens they are entitled to
a number of welfare beneﬁts while in Norway, e.g. health services,
unemployment beneﬁt and child support. However, only a very few
of our respondents had knowledge about these arrangements, and
even rarer, experiences with applying for support. This is not
surprising, given Norwegian authorities very limited efforts to
communicate such information to the migrant labour force.
5.1.2. Informalisation of employment relation
The above quotes illustrate that the work environment of many
migrants is marked by uncertainty. This may be seen as a result of
the informal nature of employment relations between farmers and
migrant workers, where terms and conditions are not explicitly
stated. This is reﬂected in the widespread lack of proper formal
work contracts, despite that such are strictly required by the
national labour regulation.
The informal nature of the employment ‘contract’ is often due to
the informal character of the recruitment process. Contrary to
descriptions in the international literature, and also to the situation
in other sectors inNorway (Napiera1a, 2008), recruitment ofmigrant
labour toNorwegian farms is rarelyorganised bywayof professional
recruiters or contractors (Rye and Frisvoll, 2007). During our
research we observed only one such case. Rather, most of the
migrants we interviewed had found their employment in Norway
through family or friends on an individual basis. Thus, the initiation
of the relation between farmers and their employees is not only
informal but also often indirect, through other employees. This adds
further confusion about the ‘rules of the game’, as the employees
oftenmerely inherit the unspoken conditions of their predecessors.
This further disempowers the workers vis-a`-vis their employers.
The case of ‘Ewa’, a teacher from Poland illustrates the problem.
She came to Norway with a friend who had worked on the farm
previous years and recommended her to the farmer. ‘Ewa’ speaks
neither Norwegian nor English and does not know anything about
the wage system on Norwegian farms. Instead, she trusts her friend
completely. When asked about her wage, she told us:
I cannot say toomuchabout this. I didn’t ask the employerabout it at
the beginning. If I tried to ask other people, nobody wanted to
answer, they say ‘maybe somuch,maybe not’. (.) I don’t knowhow
much I should expect to earn because I don’t know the wages and I
don’t know how to count it. (.) I don’t have my own copy of the
contract. I took it to the police and left it there but I admit that I didn’t
even read it. (.) I had it inmy hands so I could read it carefully but I
didn’t analyse it. I rested on what my friend told me. (‘Ewa’)
The informality of the recruitment process encourages long-
lasting relationships between the two parties. If they establish
a good relationship during the ﬁrst year of work on a given farm,
both farmers and migrants save time and resources by repeating
the work relation in the future. In this way, relationships between
employers and employees are built throughout many years,
resulting in the reciprocity of trust. Therefore, formal written
contracts are often neglected, and where such do exist, they are
often openly violated. This is demonstrated by the quotations of
‘Andrzej’ and ‘Maria’:
We don’t have written contract. No! We just go and work for three
months. We do not need contract. I trust [the farmer] and [the
farmer] trust me, that is good enough. (‘Andrzej’)The contract is in Norwegian. It says the length of my stay, the
salary per hour, that the farmer is representing me. I trust him
completely. I don’t have the document at the moment [.] I don’t
put too much attention to it. The farmer explained me everything in
detail once. It wouldn’t enter my mind to check the things he says.
(‘Maria’)
The lightness with which migrants often treat their employ-
ment contracts stems also from the awareness of the disparity
between the ofﬁcial contract and reality. ‘Karol’ works without
a written contract. However, he had recently found out that he
should have one, and had asked his employer about it:
.two weeks passed and I think nothing will happen [.] so, it’s not
their business to do it like this. [.] In the farm opposite us, [.]
they have the contract [.] and there is written that you are
earning such money for an hour, you can work such load of hours,
and here is a little mistake because they know, ok, there is 45 hours
for week and he sign it, but between us, if you want to work more,
no problem, you can work twelve hours per day, it’s ok. (‘Karol’)
The absence of formal and writtenwork contracts, as well as the
negligence of the issue altogether, although often emphasised in
the existing literature (Kasimis and Papadopoulos, 2005; Hoggart
and Mendoza, 1999; Jentsch et al., 2007), is remarkable within the
context of the Norwegian labour market. We believe this relates to
the institutionalisation of informal norms among farmers which
allow for different treatment of migrant and domestic workers. The
following quote of ‘Vladmir’ illustrates how conditions are
perceived to vary along nationality lines in a way that even the
discriminated actors do not question but only acknowledge.
‘Vladmir’ from Latvia agreed with the farmer on 85 NOK [10.47
EUR] hourly wage, and although he was not really satisﬁed with it
and knew he was entitled to better payment, he never tried to
negotiate the wage with the farmer:
Interviewer: What if you asked for wage rise?
‘Vladmir’: I don’t know. He [the farmer] may say ‘go home to Latvia’
[.]
Interviewer: Do you receive overtime pay?
‘Vladmir’: No, it doesn’t work that way for me. This is only for you,
Norwegians! [.]
Interviewer: Do you receive extra pay for weekend work?
‘Vladmir’: Funny question!5.1.3. Marginalisation and the dynamics of the migratory process
Migrants’ positions in individual employment relations are
further undermined by their weak position on the Norwegian
labour market and in society in general, which echoes that of the
situation described for agricultural migrant labour in most Western
societies (see e.g. Bauder’s study in Ontario, Canada). Most of
migrants work in an isolated environment of the farm from dawn
till dusk, and the farm family is often their only contact to the local
community or the host society (Rye, 2007b). Often, only one or two
migrants work on a given farm, which may be located a consider-
able geographical distance from other farms. Such social and
geographical isolation makes any form of collective action difﬁcult,
if not impossible. Migrants also tend to work long days and have
little spare time for trade union work. The temporary character of
their stay, leading to high rotation of workers and problems of
leadership, also plays an important role, as Piore (1979) has argued.
Furthermore, Norwegian trade unions have shown little interest in
the conditions of migrant farmworkers, and have hardly made any
efforts to recruit members from the new migrant agricultural
labour force. As a result, migrant farm workers have developed no
collective agenda for claiming their rights and there is no
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acknowledged by ‘Piotr’:
‘Piotr’: Everybody would like it to be as in Poland, like a monthly
salary but for them [the farmers] it’s better this way because they
have the money on the account;
Interviewer: Did somebody try to negotiate with the farmer to get
a monthly salary?
‘Piotr’: I suspect that nobody did.;
Interviewer: Do you know why?
‘Piotr’: There is no such organisation here among the Poles, we
don’t have time for it and some don’t want to irritate the farmers.
The lack of formal representation of migrant farm workers
makes threats of discharge credible, a factor that discourages
migrants from attempts of bargaining. Some of our interviews
indicate that such threats have been explicitly made, as in the case
of ‘Jarek’. He earned about 55 NOK [6.77 EUR] per hour but knew
that the minimum wage according to the transitional regulations
the previous year was 83 NOK [10.22 EUR].When askedwhether he
tried to negotiate with his employer, he answered:
Yes, I did. He said: ‘if you want it [83 NOK per hour] I can pay that
much but you will not come here next year’.
The abundance of labour from Eastern Europe adds to the
credibility of such threats. Big differences in incomes, coupled with
difﬁculties on the labour markets in Eastern Europe create strong
migration incentives which are additionally fuelled by the devel-
oping social networks between Norway and the sending countries.
The importance of networks in shaping migration ﬂows has been
emphasised by Massey (1990,1999). According to his theory of
cumulative causation everymigration changes the context inwhich
another migration takes place. After the migration ﬂow reaches
a critical point, it becomes a self-perpetuating process. Expanding
social networks make the migration decision and migration itself
a lot easier that it was for pioneers. In this sense, growing numbers
of new migrants create pressure for those already working on
Norwegian farms. ‘Tomek’, young migrant from Poland acknowl-
edges this fact:
Interviewer: So the fact that there are more [Poles] in Norway
makes it easier for farmer to pay less?
‘Tomek: Yes, it will be so in every place where there will be a lot of
people, the farmers will hire illegally or pay less than it is required,
and there is this issue that people will work more than it is declared
in the contract, it should be said so, that people on the farms work
more than it is written in the contract. So, you get the same money
for more work, there are no overtime payments’.
Moreover, given the farm workers lack of knowledge about and
experience of the culture in the recipient country, they have few
opportunities to seek alternative work on other farms, and even
less within other sectors of the economy. As observed by migration
scholars, social networks play vital role for migrants concerning
access to information and employment in the host country.
However, networks also inﬂuence migrants’ behaviour in the
receiving country and have the potential of isolating them from the
host society (Kritz et al., 1992). Most of the farm workers we
interviewed got their jobs through family members or friends
already working at one speciﬁc farm. Thus, the individual worker
rarely relates to the Norwegian agrarian labour market in general,
but has to decide whether or not to accept the particular job offer.
This decision includes an acceptance of the term of wage and labour
conditions offered. Once migrants arrive on the farm, these are in
practical terms non-negotiable.Thus, for the individual worker, the actual choice is between the
offered work or no work in Norway. The former alternative is
usually chosen, as even a lousy job in Norway is judged as relatively
good compared to no employment, or poor employment in the
home country. In terms of Hirschman (1970), migrants have few
resources to protest (voice). However, their exit-strategy is not to
ﬁnd alternative employment within the Norwegian labour market
but is limited to exiting it altogether, thus giving up what, after all,
is good money judged from their homeland perspective. This will
be discussed in closer detail in the next section.
5.2. Frame of reference
In his article on the status paradox of migration, Nieswand
(2006) points to the importance of taking into account migrants’
situations in their home countries while analysing the processes of
their marginalisation within the host country’s labour market. This
transnational aspect of migrants’ experience is especially important
when considering short-term migration, as usually is the case for
migrant farm workers. The importance of the temporariness of
migration in the shaping of migrants’ perceptions of their wage and
work conditions has been stressed by Piore (1979), who argues that
in the case of temporary migration there is a sharp distinction
betweenwork and the social identity of a worker, which is situated
in his/her home country). Massey et al. (1993) similarly emphasise
that the disjuncture in living standards between sending and
receiving countries makes low-wages seem generous to the
migrant. The importance of the home country’s frame of reference
ﬁnds evidence in our empirical material. Describing wages and
working conditions, migrants refer to the wage levels in their
countries of origin, as observed in the following quotes by ‘Slawek’
and ‘Alina’:
.compared to the Norwegian rate it [the salary] is laughable, as
far as I know their basic rate is 150 NOK [18.47 EUR] per hour
minimum and we have a lot less. [.]It is affordable for us because
there are different conditions, different rates for everything in
Poland [.] in Poland you couldn’t save so much money in one and
a half year as you earn here in three months. (‘Slawek’)
.the wage isn’t too high but for Polish standards it is, so it’s
a relative matter. (‘Alina’)
Thus, even though migrants’ wages are low in the Norwegian
context, they evaluate their earnings according to standards in their
homeland and consider them not only as satisfactory but as good,
or even very good. However, this perspective relies on the workers’
mental approach to their farm work in Norway. By conceptualising
their work stay as a short and non-permanent exception in their
regular everyday life in their homeland, they are able to view their
stay in Norway as an extension to their ‘normal’ homeland life. This
frame of reference is rarely contested, as most of their time in
Norway is spent working with fellow countrymen who share the
same view that wages and labour conditions are acceptable and
preferable compared to homeland standards. Therefore, migrants
do not aspire to the work and welfare rights of ‘native’ Norwegians.
Time off from work is similarly spent with people of the same
nationality. There are usually few arenas for social contact with
Norwegians, and thus migrants are not exposed to their consuming
patterns (Rye, 2007b), which might have made evident that their
wages are relatively low. This ﬁnding is concordant with Piore’s
description of the characteristics of the migratory labour markets,
in which migrants’ wages heavily depend on relative isolation from
the domestic workers, especially in the realm of payment (Piore,
1979).
This homeland perspective is further reinforced by the use of
strategies that emphasise their status as short-term visitors and not
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few spend their incomes in Norway but save money for
consumption in their homeland. It is also commonplace to bring
meals for several weeks from home, in order to avoid expenses in
Norway. Migrants employing this strategy have been described by
Eade et al. (2006) in their study of Polish migrants in London as
‘storks’ – migrants employed seasonally in low-paid sectors of the
market, who stay abroad for 2–6 months, use network channels of
recruitment and have their point of reference exclusively in Poland,
in their family environment.
Establishment of a homeland frame of reference for the wage
and work conditions in Norway depends on migrants’ status as
short-term, seasonal workers. The typical stay of the migrant
labour force is 1 or 2 months, and only on a few farms (19.3%)
migrant workers stay longer than 3 months (Rye, 2006). Interest-
ingly, those who reside more permanently in Norway were less
likely to evaluate their work conditions from an outsider’s
perspective and often paralleled their situation to that of Norwe-
gians. One can argue, in accordance with Piore’s analysis that
prolonged stays in Norway lead to the expansion of social contacts
and closer attachment to the country, which consequently give rise
to changes in professional aspirations and the development of the
awareness of the social status related to the job performed.
Summarising, the situation for the major part of the Eastern
European labour force within Norwegian agriculture seems para-
doxical. From a ‘Norwegian’ perspective, they are clearly among the
most disempowered actors in the Norwegian labour market.
Migrants receive low-wages and poor labour conditions and they
are poorly situated to negotiate and improve their terms. At the
same time, from an ‘Eastern European’ perspective they are privi-
leged by high wages compared to their homeland earnings.
Moreover, labour migration for many is the best or only strategy to
avoid unemployment or other market risks. By working abroad
migrants make savings for important investments, acquire neces-
sary capital and strengthen their domestic budgets. Thus, migrants’
situation can be seen as highly incongruent: thanks to their earn-
ings abroad they can aspire to higher living standard in their home
countries and lift their social status, while at the same time, they
are a groupwho are situated close to the bottom of the social ladder
in Norway. This phenomenon has been described by Nieswand
(2006) as ‘the status paradox of migration’.
6. Structural disempowerment
In this paper we have analysed the processes of wage formation
between farmers and new migrant worker populations. We have
shown that the transitional rules and other labour regulations
issued by the Norwegian government in order to combat ‘social
dumping’ are rarely implemented at farm level. Rather, informal
labour arrangements are established, often resulting in underpay-
ment, instability and uncertainty of work on the part of the migrant
workers.
In traditional labourmarket theory, wages are assumed to be the
result of negotiations between the two key elements of the labour
relationship who have control over different sorts of resources;
workers controlling labour, and employers controlling capital. The
individual labour relationship is thus, an exchange, in which
workers trade their labour for wages. Wage levels reﬂect on the one
hand, the quality of labour force and on the other, the complexity of
work. One might argue that the institutionalising norms of the
underpayment of wages for the agricultural migrant labour force on
Norwegian farms are simply a reﬂection of the value of their work,
as work in agriculture is characterised by simple, manual tasks.
However, this logic is undermined by the discussion above. Firstly,
by the fact that in our sample the average educational level ofmigrants was relatively high – almost half of the migrants had
tertiary education. Rather, as emphasised by Bauder (2006), we see
that the segmentation of the labour market also involves a process
that leads to a devaluation of migrants’ educational credentials and
previous work experience. Secondly, the wage paid for most
domestic hired farm workers is substantially higher. Interestingly,
the results from a national and statistically representative survey
show that farmers employing migrant workers evaluate their work
quality as high (Rye, 2006), with language differences judged to be
rather unproblematic (Rye and Frisvoll, 2007).
This observation indicates that other factors play a signiﬁcant
role in the shaping of agricultural migrant workers’ wage and
labour conditions. We argue that there are particularly two sets of
factors underlying this phenomenon, each reﬂecting and elabo-
rating on the dual labour market theory: Firstly, the structural
disempowerment of migrant farmworkers gives them a very weak
negotiating position vis-a`-vis their employers, the farmers.
Secondly, the migrant workers’ homeland frame of reference for
wage levels makes their wages in Norway appear not only accept-
able but relatively high, and thus lowers their incentives to nego-
tiate better payments.
The implementation of post-2004 transitional rules might be
viewed as an attempt by state authorities to protect workers and
provide them with a tool that strengthens their position vis-a`-vis
capital. However, despite the authorities’ efforts, ofﬁcial regulations
are often replaced by informal labour arrangements at the farm
level. This is due to the lack of proper control instruments on the
farm and to the characteristics of work in agriculture. Without the
state’s ﬁnancial and organisational capacity to control the imple-
mentation of labour regulations, these rules are largely theoretical,
as discussed in this paper.
The present study also illustrates the particularities of the
Norwegian agriculture in terms of the actual labour regulations
experienced by the migrant labour workforce. The paper provides
a somewhat different picture than described both in studies of
other national agricultural contexts (cross-national differences) as
well as in studies of other Norwegian trades (cross-sectoral differ-
ences). Speciﬁcally, we will point to three such aspects: (1) the
geographical, and in effect also social and political, dispersion of
enterprises and workforce, which works as a barrier to collective
action, (2) the short-term, seasonal character of work, which
further reduces the workers’ interests in bargaining activities, and
(3) the general low earning capacity of agriculture and growing
pressures on competitiveness in the globalising agricultural
economy, which structurally constrains the level of wages within
the trade.
(1) In general, agricultural trade has fewer traditions for organised
labour than is the case for other Norwegian occupations (Hal-
berg, 1993). This is clearly demonstrated by the low level of
interest from the Norwegian trade unions in the conditions for
the present migrant labour in the agricultural sector (Rye and
Frisvoll, 2007). In addition, the physical marginalisation of
migrants plays an important role in this lack of effective
unionism. The importance of relative isolation ofmigrants from
the domestic labour force, as well as the temporariness of
labour relation (discussed in the next paragraph) in shaping
wages and engagement in unionism is emphasised in Piore’s
(1979) analysis of the dynamics of dual labour markets.
Moreover, the structure of employment, where only one or two
workers work on each farm, which additionally is usually
distant from other farms and centres of local or state admin-
istration, makes any kind of public control difﬁcult. The
geographical dispersion of Norwegian farms, an inheritance of
the agricultural policies of which the key objective was to
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limits the opportunity for migrant workers to organise them-
selves or seek help and advice. One might argue that the
situation for domestic workers is very similar; however, the
limitation of organisational opportunities for migrant workers
is further exacerbated by their lack of linguistic and wider
cultural competence and social capital.
(2) Labour migration within agriculture is primarily about
seasonal work. This strongly contributes to the ‘dis-
empowered satisfaction’ in two ways. Firstly, the short-term
character of the work makes it difﬁcult to establish collective
action between the workers, as this usually requires interac-
tion over time. Secondly, as the workers only reside in the
recipient country for a limited period of time, they judge the
wage level based on homeland standards and are able to
conceptually split their lives in two separate spheres: they
work in Norway and consume in their Eastern European
homelands. In most other occupations, such short-term
migration is less common, and thus, migrants have to spend
more of their incomes in Norway where prices are higher
(Friberg and Tyldum, 2007).
(3) The general low earning capacity of agriculture arguably
contributes to the observed practices. Many farmers claim
that the consequence of higher wages will lead to the closing
down of production and, thus, ﬁring their seasonal
employees (cf Møller and Jensen, 1999). Growing pressures
from the global market such as higher competitiveness in the
production of raw commodities additionally forces farmers to
cut costs. The enhanced bargaining power of the retail chains,
which in Norway as elsewhere have been strongly centralised
as result of restructuring processes (Stræte and Jacobsen,
2002), leaving only a handful of buyers of farm products,
adds further pressure towards cost savings in farm produc-
tion. As migrant workers are very vulnerable, cutting their
wages is the easiest strategy to reduce the costs of
production.
Taken together, these factors reduce the likelihood of future
improvement of pay and work conditions for migrant workers on
Norwegian farms. Moreover, we claim that migrants’ problems in
some ways seem more cemented in Norway than in many other
countries with industrialised agricultural production, due to the
historical and present-day context of farming. This is worth noting,
as labour generally has gained a relatively strong position versus
capital in the Norwegian welfare society, much a result of the
intimate relationship between the trade unions and the social
democratic party which has been in government for much of the
post-war period (Dølvik et al., 2007). For the present discussion of
migrant workers in the agriculture, however, it is signiﬁcant that
the speciﬁcs of the Norwegian agricultural case would seem to
contribute to, rather than modify, the disempowerment of the
migrant workers.
First, the historical inheritance of the state seasonal immigra-
tion quota programme in operation between 1990 and 2004 was
the establishment of a practice where individual farmers recruited
individual workers. Such direct hiring has continued as the
dominant way of organising migrant labour within Norwegian
agriculture, despite that the post-enlargement regulations allow
for alternatives, e.g. subcontracting, as observed in other trades
(Dølvik and Eldring, 2006). This, in combination with the
geographically dispersed farm structure, a result of the country’s
geography and political objectives of maintaining a scattered
settlement structure, generated an ‘individualised’ migrant work
stock with strong loyalties towards their employers. As shown,
this is still the case.Second, the very structure of Norwegian agricultural policies
with its emphasis on maintaining a large number of small
production units combined with a high degree of family farming,
both in terms of ownership and labour input (Bjørkhaug and Ble-
kesaune, 2008), has given less space for large scale and professional
organising of contract work.
A third and related particularity of the Norwegian case is the
relative absence of trade unions within the farming sector. While
more than half of the total workforce belongs to workers unions
(Nergaard and Stokke, 2007), unionism is more or less non-existent
within farming, much a result for the traditional small-scale and
family farming character of Norwegian agriculture.
Taken together, this implies that no social or political structures
are present that may provide the basic requirements for future
collective action that would challenge the present labour–capital
regime.
7. Conclusions
The Norwegian context generates a consolidated set of conditions
where the marginalised and individualised agricultural migrant
labour force has few prospects of improved work situations. Farmers
are looking for cheap and docile labour to ﬁll domestic labour
shortages and to minimise production cost in order to survive in
a trade facing increased pressure from globalised markets. The
migrants, on their side, have few options other than accepting up-
front the work conditions offered by Norwegian farm employers, as
the formal labour regulations are not effectively implemented by the
state at the farm level. Due to poor knowledge about their legal
entitlements and few organisational structures that could help
advocate their case effectively, migrants become structurally dis-
empowered and have few or no resources withwhich to invoke their
formal rights. Moreover, they are isolated from the Norwegian work
and social environment due to their lack of social capital in the host
country. Their frame of reference is that of their home countries.
Therefore, poor working conditions in Norwegian terms are still
found satisfactory compared with those of the jobs available in
Eastern European labour markets. In concordance with Piore’s
(1979) arguments, the temporary character of migration leads to the
separation of work identity and social identity, the latter remaining
embedded in theworker’s home country. A low-status job inNorway
enables migrants to achieve their consumption goals and strategies
in home countries, thus contributing to their higher status there. This
aspect of the migratory process has been described as the ‘status
paradox of migration’ (Nieswand, 2006).
At the same time, the Norwegian case presented in this paper also
demonstrates in detail how a secondary labour market may appear,
unfold and intensify despite government’s good intentions and
active policies to counteract such developments. At the micro-level,
in everyday life encounters between farmers and migrants, the
measures of the authorities are outstripped by informal agreements
between the parties. In the process of shaping these agreements, the
power is predominantly in the hands of employers. The labour–
capital contract is a result of a dictation rather than negotiation.
The present study clearly illustrates the importance of the
national context in analysing the establishment of ethnic migrant
niches in the labour markets of advanced capitalist societies; in this
case the agricultural historical structures, current agricultural
policies and established farm level practices, in combination with
immigration history and policies. In particular, the small-scale and
geographically dispersed farming structure of Norway, traditionally
relying on family labour, generates social environments where
migrant workers develop loyalties towards their employer, rather
than collaborating with other migrant workers in collective action
to change the terms of employment. The short-term character of
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to improve work conditions.
The implicationof theseﬁndings is theneed foranalysisofmigrant
labour which is more sensitive to the national and sectorial contexts
within which migrants’ everyday working lives are embedded. The
structural conditions for agricultural migrant workers in Norway are
different from that of their fellow citizensworking in other sectors of
the Norwegian economy, however, they are also diverging from that
ofmigrant agriculturalworkers in otherWestern European countries.
Accordingly, future studies of migrant farm workers need to be
embedded within and analysed in light of national contexts.
The analysis presented above raises important questions for the
use of migrant farm labour within agriculture, in particular with
regard to the need for the enforcement of state regulation of labour
relations. The observed practices of underpayment of migrant
workers actualise the shape and the effectiveness of the transi-
tional rules and similar labour regulations. Our analysis suggests
that state authorities need new and reﬁned instruments to make
the implementation of the labour regulations for migrant work in
the agriculture more universal, that is, instruments which are
closer to the farm level.
Furthermore, from an equity perspective, this paper indicates
the need of stronger incorporation of migrants into the local
community and broader society. Some actions have been already
taken in the Norwegian building and construction sector, where
workers unions make efforts to engage migrants in their activities
by providing information and counsel in their mother tongues.
Even though this may be perceived as less important for short-term
migrant workers, it would present a tool to combat social dumping,
as it gives a voice and an arena through which migrant workers can
claim their rights. As long as only formal regulations, and not
micro-level empowerment of migrants, takes place, the Norwegian
agricultural migrant workers are likely to keep their position at the
bottom rung of the ladder in the Norwegian labour market.References
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